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One persistent element in the received version of Canadian 
cultural and economic history is the symbiotic relationship in which 
national identity and state economic activity are seen to exist. On the 
one hand, a large measure of state participation has been regarded as 
an important distinguishing feature of Canadain capitalism. On the 
other, the willingness of Canadians to accept such participation is 
said to be a product of their desire to preserve a distinct identity, to 
survive independently on the North American continent. Nowhere is 
the belief in this interconnection more evident than in studies of 
Canadian broadcasting policy. 
In 1932 the federal government created the Canadian Radio 
Broadcasting Commission, forerunner of the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, to regulate and control and also to carry 
on the business of broadcasting in Canada. This action, which 
represented a significant departure from the minimal controls which 
government had imposed on the industry during its first decade of 
development, laid the basis of a new Canadian broadcasting system. 
The inception of state ownership, partial as it was, produced a mixed 
public-private system which seemed to stand midway between the 
patterns established in Great Britain and the United States. It 
appeared to reflect, in a sphere of obvious cultural importance, the 
"British North American" mentality of Canada - a compromise 
between British paternalist collectivism and American possessive 
individualism. It seemed at once a product of Canada's desire for 
survival and an assertion of its peculiar national character. 
The nationalist basis of the state's active role in Canadian radio 
requires, it would seem, re-examination from two directions. First, it 
is useful to recall the origins of the British and American 
broadcasting systems. To a large extent, from comparing these two 
systems we may see the Canadian system as a manifestation of a 
peculiar "public enterprise" culture. Second, the nationalism of the 
public ownership movement needs to be seen in its historical context. 
By whom was the national sentiment expressed? With what interests 
did it coincide? What needs, other than national ones, were felt and 
expressed in the conflict over state ownership? Above all, what was 
the condition of the broadcasting industry at the time and what was 
its relationship to other industries of communication? This paper will 
argue that the changes introduced in the 1930's had their roots less in 
a visionary design intended once and for all to solve the problems of 
Canadian broadcasting, than in a sequence of responses to 
technological and economic conditions peculiar to the time. 
International exchange and national protectionism were both 
present as radio moved from a period of invention and innovation to 
one of commercial development. The names of Hertz, a German, 
Lodge, an Englishman, Branly, a Frenchman, Popoff, a Russian, 
DeForest, an American, Fessenden, a Canadian in the United States, 
and of course Marconi, an Italian in England, figure prominently in 
the process of technical development which radio underwent from 
the late nineteenth century to 1914. The discovery of one was built 
upon by another. Telegraphy and telephony, both limited to point- 
to-point communication, were succeeded by broadcasting, and the 
focus on invention, though itself by no means separate from business 
interest, was followed by a growing awareness of the commercial 
potentialities of the new medium. As these were realized, the 
producers and distributors of radio receiving sets demanded a 
standard form of industrial protectionism against the competition of 
foreign rivals. And the nationalism which this produced was 
reinforced by the nature of the broadcasting medium: the limited 
number of wavelengths generated a kind of wavelength 
protectionism. Nevertheless, this very limitation necessitated some 
degree of international regulation in the interest of the industry's 
stability and rationalization. National interest and international 
need coexist rather uneasily in the early years of broadcasting. 
As the slgniiicance of the "wireless" gradually became evident, ' 
governments responded in varying ways, according to the situation 
in their respective countries. We have come to regard the responses of 
the British and American governments as two sharply contrasting 
alternatives in broadcasting policy. One eventually created a 
completely state-owned system based on a concept of radio as a 
"public service"; the other eventually opted for a policy of regulation 
of a privately-owned system based on the commercial profitability of 
the medium, particularly for advertising. Careful attention must be 
paid, however, to the use of the word "eventually" in both cases. As 
Asa Briggs has observed, "In their birth and infancy ... they were not 
so distinct as they have since become."' In each case, choices were 
made, rejected or by-passed. The patterns established in Great 
Britain and the United States, and in Canada, were the product not 
so much of a peculiar collective mentality as of a particular 
conjuncture of pressures and circumstances. 
The BBC was established in October, 1922 at a very early stage of 
British broadcasting history. But it was not at this time the public 
corporation which later, in 1927, it was to become. Rather, the BBC 
was initially the British Broadcasting Company, a government- 
sponsored consortium of wireless manufacturers which undertook to 
provide radio programs to the public. Under the general jurisdiction 
of the Post Office, and limited by its charter to a fixed dividend rate 
of 7.5 percent, the Company was capitalized by the sale of shares to 
bona fide British manufacturers of wireless apparatus. While it did 
not become so, to no small extent because of its first director, 
the company was at first formed as an arm of the manufacturing 
industry. It was, in short, a business enterpri~e.~ 
Two points about the Company's formation are of immediate 
importance. Not only was it the first government venture, aside from 
licensing control, into the field of broadcasting in Britain, but it was 
also the first significant company of any kind to be constituted 
mainly for broadcasting purposes. Numerous broadcasts of an 
experimental nature had previously been made, by amateurs and by 
manufacturers. But with the possible exception of the "Writtle" 
station, with which the Marconi firm was connected, and the 
unofficial transmissions of the Metropolitan-Vickers company 
station in Manchester, no company had proceeded beyond the stage 
of application for a license by the time the BBC was created. 
Secondly, the venture was embarked upon at a period when the 
potential of radio, for profit, entertainment or enlightenment, was 
only beginning to be recognized. Even by late 1923, when the report 
of the first parliamentary inquiry into broadcasting had been 
brought down, that of the Sykes Committee, control of the wireless 
was not seen as a topic of major public importance. In its first 
incarnation, the BBC was very much a part of the birth, in Britain, of 
broadcasting itself. 
Among British manufacturers, Marconi's Wireless Telegraph 
Company was the first to become actively interested in building and 
operating  station^.^ It was followed by the Metropolitan-Vickers 
Electrical Company early in 1922 and, as the year wore one, other 
companies expressed their desire to enter the field, including the 
Western Electric Company, a branch of the American Bell 
Telephone group. The interest of the manufacturers, not 
surprisingly, was in the development and sale of radio receiving sets. 
In applying for a broadcasting license the head of research at 
Metrovick "referred to  the successful broadcasts of the American 
Westinghouse Company, the opportunities for research and 
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technical development which experience of a British broadcasting 
station would provide, the possible market for radio sets which all 
radio manufacturers would share, and the likely canalization of 
amateur interest and enthusiasm." This last point was aimed at 
ordering and reducing the growing number of transmissions being 
made by amateur radio buffs. Broadcasting activity would give 
Metrovick "a popular standing as a radio power."' It is interesting to 
to note as well the commercial alternatives perceived by the 
manufacturers during their later negotiations with the government. 
Advertising was left alone "for present." The sale of broadcasting 
stations was prevented by government conditions and by the limited 
profit potential of building the small number of stations that were 
thought to be required. Expansion of the market for receiving sets 
appeared to be the only hope. 
Jurisdiction over the transmission of radio signals, interpreted to 
include both sending and receiving, rested with the Postmaster- 
General, having grown out of his responsibility for telegraphy and 
telephony, and it was to his department that these companies made 
their applications for broadcast licenses. Reacting particularly to 
complaints of interference from the military, the Post Office replied 
that the airwaves were already crowded. In May it initiated a series of 
meetings with the manufacturers in an attempt to arrive at a design 
for orderly development. This action, as we shall see, was prompted 
to a very large extent by the chaotic progress of the American 
broadcasting boom. 
The discussions which ensued did not reveal striking philosophical 
differences between the parties involved. The Post Office entered the 
negotiations with a skeletal plan in mind. This had been devised in 
consultation with other government departments through the 
Wireless Sub-Committee of the Imperial Communications 
Committee, which itself had consulted the two largest radio interests, 
Marconi and Metrovick. The idea of government ownership was 
categorically rejected. Sir Henry Norman, chairman of the Wireless 
Sub-Committee, even envisaged a competitive system and, in so 
doing, reflected the general acceptance of commercial operation: 
each company would provide a service, "and there will be natural 
rivalry to furnish the most attractive programmes, since hearers may 
conclude that the firm supplying the best entertainment in the 
clearest manner is most likely to make good apparatu~."~ The 
preference of the Post Office, however, was for one company, or 
perhaps two, in which all the manufacturing firms would participate. 
Its chief concern was allocation of the narrow band of available 
wavelengths. In this concern the manufacturers concurred. 
The manufacturers met without the presence of government 
officials to propose a company structure, and it was in this arena that 
differences arose. Dominated by the "Big Six" firms - the Marconi 
Company, Metropolitan-Vickers, the Western Electric Company, 
the Radio Communications Company, the General Electric 
Company and the British Thomson-Houston Company - 
discussion faltered on the issue of who would construct the stations. 
The problem, in a word, was patent control. "Who knew what, and 
how much? How much would each party be prepared to pass on?'6 
Most especially, the Marconi Company was loathe to relinquish its 
patent superiority. Prolonged negotiation, during which it appeared 
for a time that two companies would emerge, resulted eventually in a 
one company scheme which recognized Marconi's strength and 
stipulated a neutral chairman of the board. All parties, including the 
Post Office, in fact preferred the one company idea and the 
manufacturers' main interest was in receiving sets, not stations. 
Though successfully resolved, the dispute does reflect the 
concentration of commercial interest in equipment. That interest was 
further revealed by the explicit protectionist character of the BBC. 
While not a monopoly, since entry could be achieved on the purchase 
of a •’ 1 share, membership in the company was restricted to domestic 
manufacturers who would agree to use only British-made apparatus. 
In order to avoid a free trade issue, the companies agreed to a Post 
Office suggestion that instead of completely prohibiting the import 
of foreign made apparatus, its sale be prohibited for a period of two 
years. 
After further discussions, in which the Post Office insisted that the 
board of directors include representatives of the smaller companies 
as well as the Big Six, the company was formed. Its revenue was to be 
based on a share of the license fee collected on receiving sets and a 
royalty on the sale of sets produced by BBC members. 
Over this entire process had hovered the cloud of American 
broadcasting. The chaos of the airwaves in the United States 
concerned the manufacturers and the Post Office alike, as it was 
increasingly concerning the Americans themselves. F.J. Brown, the 
Post Office official who became most directly concerned with 
broadcasting policy, spent the winter and spring of 1921-22 in the 
United States, observing the early stages of the radio boom. His visit, 
according to Briggs, "provided the requisite background of 
information and experience to  enable the Post Office to evolve a 
broadcasting policy."' Just before the meetings with manufacturers 
were called the Postmaster-General made a statement which clearly 
reflected Brown's advice. 
It would be impossible to have a large number of firms 
broadcasting. It would result only in a sort of chaos, only 
in a much more aggravated form than that which arises in 
the United States, and which has compelled the United 
States, or the Department over which Mr. Hoover 
presides, and which is responsible for broadcasting, to do 
what we are now doing at the beginning, that is, to lay 
down very drastic regulations indeed for the control of 
wireless broad~asting.~ 
The problem was not advertising, which had hardly emerged even on 
American radio: it was interference and overlapping of radio signals. 
The theme recurred again and again. That Britain had lagged behind 
the United States in broadcasting development could be turned to 
her advantage. The small number of available wavelengths could be 
utilized in an orderly and efficient manner if the lessons of the 
American example were acted upon. To quote Briggs again, "What 
was immediately apparent ... and historically of great significance was 
that for technical rather than social reasons the experience of 
American broadcasting in 1921 and 1922 could not easily be taken as 
a model on this side of the At lan t i~ ."~  
The BBC's structure, within four years of its formation, was 
radically altered. The chain of events which led to the creation of a 
wholly state-owned corporation was initiated very soon after the 
company began broadcasting. Conflict with the Post Office arose 
over an issue intimately connected to the protectionist basis of the 
BBC: licensing policy. Largely in response to the pressure of 
individuals and organized amateur wireless societies, the Post Office 
had continued the practice of issuing experimenter's licenses, 
ostensibly to genuine experimenters, which enabled them to build 
their own sets from separate components. This, as the manufacturers 
had feared, proved to be a loophole through which comparatively 
cheap foreign parts could be imported, and then easily assembled by 
the purchaser. The number of applications for experimenter's 
licenses soared, while revenue both from ordinary licenses and 
royalties failed to meet expectations. The BBC and its constituent 
companies pressed for some form of restriction on these licenses. In 
the face of pressure from businesses which had not joined the BBC, 
including the Electrical Importers' Trading Association, from 
segments of the press waging a freeenterprise-for-the-little man 
campaign, and from genuine experimenters themselves, the Post 
Office refused to act. At the same time, it was becoming evident that 
many listeners were abstaining from licenses of any kind and that 
others were making commercial use of their own radios! Not only 
was the manufacturing industry failing to reap the full benefits of the 
expanding radio market; BBC revenue for broadcasting purposes 
was suffering. The Company and the Postmaster-General, while at 
loggerheads over a solution, both recognized the danger which strict 
enforcement of the regulations implied for public support. As a 
consequence a parliamentary committee was appointed. 
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The Sykes Committee considered a wide range of broadcasting 
questions, and the idea of state ownership surfaced, if only in a very 
tentative manner.1•‹ What is important for our purposes here, 
however, is that a solution to the licensing dispute emerged from its 
deliberations and from subsequent negotiations between the BBC 
and Post Office. Protection against foreign competition was allowed 
to continue until December 31, 1924, when it would cease entirely, 
even though the Company's broadcasting contract was only to 
terminate at the end of 1926. The unforeseen implications of this 
arrangement for the relationship between the BBC and its 
constituent companies were profound. The disappearance of 
protection in effect strengthened the BBC by loosening the bond by 
which its interests were tied to those of the radio manufacturing 
bu~iness. '~ The manufacturers, for their part, became less interested 
in the economics of broadcasting than they had been in 1922. License 
fees became the sole financial support of the Company. The lesson to 
be drawn was not lost on J.C.W. Reith, the Company's Director and, 
by what had been called an "accident of management", its formative 
influence in the early years. Reith took advantage of his freedom of 
action to mould the BBC into his conception of a "public service" 
institution. His importance was such that Briggs ascribes to him the 
role of changing "twentieth-century British history by converting the 
controversial commercial Company into an established national 
in~titution."'~ 
Though much happened between the Sykes Committee report and 
the corporation character of 1927, it was a direct step from Reith's 
management of the Company to the establishment of a state 
institution intended to be independent of both the trade and the 
government. The BBC ultimately grew out of a struggle in which 
questions of philosophy and taste, both later to be focuses of 
vigorous debate, played a role secondary to the interconnected 
interests of business and technical development. The Company had 
been established at an early stage, at least in part to avert the chaos 
foreshadowed by the American experience. The institutional 
framework created in response to one set of conditions moulded 
subsequent debate, even as the framework was being transformed by 
changing commercial circumstances and John Reith. Most 
strikingly, its basis was laid at a period when the potential of 
advertising for greatly increasing the commercial profitability of 
broadcasting was only dimly perceived. In the laying of the 
groundwork for "public service" broadcasting in Britain, timing was 
crucial. 
The growing disorder of the American airwaves in 1921-22 which 
so absorbed the attention of British policy makers was a subject of 
increasing concern in the United States as well. The outstanding 
feature, indeed, of the American case was the extraordinary rapidity 
of radio's initial development. As late as the end of 1920 the 
corporate alliance that was to dominate the industry in its early years 
regarded national and international point-to-point communication 
both as its major interest and as the area in which radio's main 
potential for profit lay. In 1921 the Department of Commerce 
adopted "broadcasting" as a new station classification and between 
January and November issued five licenses. In December it issued 
twenty-three. By July of the following year the total number had 
rocketed to 458.13 The boom had arrived. 
Not only was development rapid; ~t was led by powerful 
corporations. In October, 1919, the Radio Corporation of America 
had been created with the encouragement of the government - 
indeed, with a government representative on its board of directors - 
with the aim of securing American dominance of international point- 
to-point communication. The early parties to the corporate alliance 
represented by RCA included General Electric and American 
Telephone and Telegraph, which had experienced considerable 
growth under government stimulus during the war, and Western 
Electric, AT & T's subsidiary. American Marconi was specifically 
excluded because of its close ties with its British parent.14 
Westinghouse, initially excluded from the group and searching for 
means of activating idle war-developed capacity, bought control of 
certain available patents. Large numbers of amateur operators, 
released from wartime restrictions, were now experimenting with 
radio broadcasts. Two of these were employed at Westinghouse's 
Pittsburgh plant. Their experiments, performed on their own time, 
suggested to Westinghouse the possibility of adapting for 
commercial sale the light weight, compact receivers which had been 
developed for the army during the war. If the company established a 
regular broadcasting service it might be amply rewarded for its 
efforts both by the sale of sets and by the publicity its name would 
receive. Westinghouse applied for a license and on November 2, 
1920, station KDKA went on the air to transmit the results of the 
presidential election. Newspapers responded with gratifying zeal to 
this new merchandising campaign of one of their major advertisers. 
Almost immediately retailers were faced with a mounting demand 
for receiving equipment. On June 30, 1921, Westinghouse was 
admitted to the RCA-GE-AT&T alliance.15 
Radio had entered a new phase of development; the word itself 
would soon be associated more with broadcasting than with 
telegraphy or telephony. By 1922 RCA, which acted as sales agent for 
GE and Westinghouse receiving equipment, earned more income 
from the new radio business than from marine and transoceanic 
comm~nication. '~ The alliance, now in possession of some two 
thousand patents, at once assumed a dominant position in radio 
equipment manufacturing, and would shortly occupy a strong 
position in broadcasting as well. In cementing its control the alliance 
faced resistance from smaller manufacturers and station owners who 
resented the enforcement of its patent rights. The external relations 
of the alliance constituted one of four closely related areas of conflict, 
out of which emerged, in the next ten years, the pattern of American 
broadcasting. A second of these areas lay in the alliance's internal 
relations, as AT&T successfully attempted to expand its 
broadcasting interest beyond that contemplated in the original 
agreement. A third conflict centred on government regulatory 
policy, and the fourth on a question which only gradually assumed 
pressing importance: how was broadcasting to be financed? 
Finance was at first regarded as a minor problem. A relatively 
small amount of capital was required to establish a low power 
transmitting station." Program content was usually provided by 
people who were eager to participate voluntarily in what was, after 
all, a novel and very public medium of self-expression; the excitement 
and spontaneity which surrounded the Writtle experimental 
broadcasts in Britain were duplicated in numerous towns and cities 
across the United States. More importantly, a variety of individuals 
and institutions began broadcasting, not as an end in itself, but as a 
means of supplementing and assisting their primary activities. For 
radio manufacturers, retailers, department stores and newspapers, 
broadcasting stations were a means of indirect advertising. College 
and universities thought of them in terms of extension teaching, 
home degree study and publicity for fund raising. Religious bodies 
saw in them a means of expanding their congregations. In almost no 
case was broadcasting conceived as an independent self-supporting 
business. 
Early financing proposals reflected this approach to the medium 
and, among the alternatives, direct advertising was almost 
universally rejected. No one disagreed when Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover declared at the first Washington Radio Conference 
that it was "inconceivable that we should allow so great a possibility 
for service to be drowned in advertising chatter."I8 
Yet, by the end of the twenties what had been inconceivable early 
in 1922 was well on the way to becoming the actuality of American 
radio. Increased capital costs, partly due to the inception of chain or 
network broadcasting, and increased programming costs, largely 
due to the rather abrupt decline of voluntaryism, had combined to 
make the financial question a critical one. Two other developments 
offered a possible answer. One was the extraordinary growth which 
the American advertising industry experienced during the decade, as 
manufacturers sought to expand their market for consumer goods.Ig 
The other was the success of AT&T's experiment in "toll 
broadcasting". 
According to the allocation of functions which had been part of 
the original GE-RCA-AT&T-Westinghouse agreement, American 
Telephone and Telegraph had major responsibility in the alliance for 
the production and sale of transmitters, and exclusive right to 
commercial exploitation of telephony, both wired and wireless. At 
first, though aware of the use it might make of its trunk lines for long- 
distance radio transmission, AT&T regarded broadcasting with 
caution. Not only was the company not engaged in the production of 
receiving sets; the implications of broadcasting for the future of the 
telephone business were as yet unclear. When it did take the plunge, 
early in 1922, it naturally enough built upon its telephone 
background. The company proposed to regard its radio station as 
analogous to a telephone booth: programs would be provided, not by 
the company, but by anyone who, upon payment of a "toll", wished 
to use its facilities for the purpose of broadcasting a program of his 
own choosing. "Just as the company leases its long distance wire 
facilities for the use of newspapers, banks and other concerns, so it 
will lease its radio telephone facilities and will not provide the matter 
which is sent out from this station."'O AT&T's emphasis on the 
telephonic character of its experiment was shrewd as well as natural. 
While its partners in the alliance were not at that time concerned with 
income from broadcasting itself, it had nonetheless staked a claim, 
based on its telephony rights in the alliance agreement, to exclusive 
commercial use of "public radio telephone broadcasting". 
The experiment was not an immediate success. The reputed line- 
ups of customers at retail radio outlets were not duplicated at the 
door of AT&T's New York station, WEAF. Complaints were voiced 
that the venture would produce just the kind of "advertising 
chatter" that almost everyone else wished to avoid. It was realized as 
well that some system of "sustaining," unsponsored programs was 
needed if listeners were to be available on those occasions when 
sponsors chose to purchase air time. AT&T employed its transmitter 
patent rights in an effort to force station applicants in the New York 
area to use WEAF facilities, and later exploited its control of 
telephone lines to link stations - and audiences - together in a 
"network". Notwithstanding the difficulties it encountered the 
company gradually built a clientele of sponsors. Advertising at this 
stage was usually indirect rather than direct. This is to say, that a 
simple announcement was made, sans sales pitch, that a program was 
sponsored by such-and-such a company, or, alternatively, the 
announcement was built into the program title, as in the National 
Carbon Company's "Eveready Hour". By 1925, WEAF's revenues 
had turned the corner.21 
It is important to note that only gradually did other stations follow 
its lead, some in order to gain access to AT&T long lines. Yet as radio 
emerged from the novelty stage in the middle and late twenties, 
AT&T's "toll broadcasting" venture had a dual significance. It 
initiated technically proficient network broadcasting and thus 
providing a means of reaching a large, even a national audience. And 
it offered a potential solution to radio's growing financial problem. 
Manufacturers and advertising agencies began to turn their attention 
to network broadcasting as a means of creating their market. The 
American Tobacco Company, for example, sponsored the "Lucky 
Strike Orchestra" as one element in a sales strategy, implemented in 
1925, which involved disposing of its minor cigarette brands in 
favour of a concentrated effort to market Lucky  strike^.^^ 
Commercialization advanced slowly and then, with the inauguration 
of regular national network programming at the end of 1928, more 
q~ickly .~ '  Direct advertising began to be used more extensively than 
before. By 193 1, advertising agencies were developing and producing 
virtually all sponsored network programs. The battle of commercial 
and non-commercial interests was now fully joined, but it was also 
too late to confront an industry which by then had grown to include 
not only stations, networks and manufacturers, but also advertising 
agencies, recording companies, press agents, trade papers and trade 
associations. Even the newspaper industry, increasingly concerned 
about the diversion of advertising revenue, was forced to 
compromise on the issue of news b r~adcas t ing .~~  
AT&T applied its restrictive policy on the use of its telephone long 
lines against stations operated by its own allies, as well as against 
others. This, together with the intention of its subsidiary, Western 
Electric, to begin producing receiving sets, led in 1923 to a long, 
vigorous and complicated legal struggle within the alliance, albeit 
one which was carried on for the most part behind closed doors.25 At 
the same time, both RCA and AT&T launched a more public 
campaign against alleged infringements of their patent rights on 
receiving sets and transmitting devices.26 The details of these two 
conflicts need not concern us here. By 1925, however, divisiveness in 
the radio industry had attained almost chaotic proportions. The 
action against smaller stations and manufacturers led to an 
investigation of the industry by the Federal Trade Commission, with 
a view to possible violation of anti-trust laws. Within the alliance, the 
"radio group", composed mainly of RCA, GE and Westinghouse, 
and the "telephone group", composed of AT&T and Western 
Electric, slowly advanced through remarkably secret arbitration 
proceedings and negotiations toward their own re-appointment of 
the radio empire. In 1925, David Sarnoff, General Manager of RCA, 
linked his idea of an "independent" broadcasting company to toll 
broadcasting as a means of support. The parties finally reached 
agreement in the summer of 1926. AT&T withdrew from 
broadcasting and transferred its facilities to the "radio group", 
which in turn created a new corporation, the National Broadcasting 
Company, to take over its network business. AT&T was 
compensated by a lucrative contract for the use of its long lines. In 
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the meantime, out of court and by means of licensing agreements, the 
telephone company resolved its dispute with most of the stations 
which allegedly had infringed on its transmitter patents. Similar 
agreements were reached in 1927 between RCA and a number of set 
manufacturers. The FTC slackened, then dropped, its anti-trust 
action. The partners of the original radio alliance emerged from this 
rather hectic game of musical chairs relatively secure in their 
dominance of what was becoming the American broadcasting 
system.27 
As these conflicts were being resolved the American Congress, 
after five years of indecision, was finally reaching agreement on new 
regulatory legislation. Attempts at regulation during the early 1920's 
were obstructed by an inadequate legislative framework, created in 
1912 with marine communication in mind, which required licensing 
of transmitting stations but not as receiving sets.28 The act, 
moreover, gave the Secretary of Commerce no discretion to refuse an 
application for license as long as the applicant fulfilled certain 
requirements. Between 1923 and 1926, the Secretary tested the 
limits of his authority, first by re-allocating wavelengths (to the 
advantage of the patent allies), then by turning down license 
applicants, but this action was successfully contested in the courts in 
1926.29 Prodded by critical need, Congress passed a new radio act in 
1927. 
A Federal Radio Commission was created, on a temporary basis, 
and empowered to regulate all types of radio comm~nica t ion .~~  This 
included, among other things, the power to allocate wavelengths and 
to grant, renew or revoke broadcasting licenses according to its 
assessment of "public convenience, interest or necessity." The 
Commission was to give special attention, underlined by an 
amendment of the following year, to ensuring national coverage on 
an equitable basis. The original intention of the legislation was that, 
after a year, licensing authority would pass to the Secretary of 
Commerce. The commission's authority was periodically renewed. 
However, until in 1934 it was replaced on a permanent basis by the 
Federal Communications Commission. Except for minor 
modifications which accompanied the establishment of the FCC, the 
1927 act set the pattern of government regulation of broadcasting in 
the United States. 
The shape of American broadcasting, by no means predictable 
even in 1925, thus emerged with some clarity by the late 1920's and 
early 1930's. The primary coordinates which defined the American 
system were private ownership of broadcasting facilities (mainly by 
large corporate entities); government regulation; and finance by 
means of commercial advertising. As in Britain, though with quite 
different results, the system developed gradually and uncertainly, by 
a succession of specific responses to changing technological, 
institutional and legislative circumstances. 
The study of British and American broadcasting development is 
instructive in two respects for our understanding of the Canadian 
experience. In the first place, it can be argued that the story of the 
early years of broadcasting in Britain, the United States and Canada 
is one story rather than three, at least from the Canadian point of 
view. For example, the changing technology and structure of the 
Canadian radio industry to  some extent followed on developments in 
the other two countries, particularly the U.S. This was especially true 
with respect to the industry's financial basis. Also, the debate which 
came during the early 1930's about the nature of Canadian 
broadcasting was influenced by the crystallizing of alternatives - 
private and state, commercial and non-commercial, public service 
and entertainment - which had taken place overseas and south of 
the border over the previous decade. The context of decision-making 
in Canada thus was entirely different than it had been earlier both in 
Britain and the United States, not only because Canadian 
development had been somewhat different but because the British 
and American patterns had already been formed. 
Secondly, this study gives rise to serious doubts about the validity 
of interpreting the origins of the British and American patterns' of 
broadcasting in terms of contrasting "value" systems. The doubts 
are important because this interpretation has influenced the 
historiography of Canadian broadcasting. The "collectivism" of 
state ownership in Britain and the "individualism" of private 
ownership in the United States have provided an implicit 
comparative framework within which the origins of the Canadian 
system have themselves been interpreted. If the study rejects this 
framework, however, it also suggests another, one which directs our 
attention more to specific technical and economic factors than to a 
unique set of political and cultural values in order to explain the role 
of the state in Canadian broadcasting. 
When the basic decision was made to create a state broadcasting 
enterprise, the Canadian radio industry was in a weak condition. 
During the twenties broadcasting had evolved from a subsidiary 
activity, designed to promote the broadcaster's primary commercial, 
religious or educational interest, to a business in its own right. Yet with 
few exceptions, local stations lacked markets of sufficient size to 
attract large amounts of advertising revenue, and even at the network 
level the same factor imposed limits on expansion. 
Perhaps the most important of the early license holders was the 
Canadian National Railway system, which in a highly innovative 
manner had begun broadcasting partly to improve communication 
within the corporation itself but mainly to attract and hold traffic. 
"As an advertising medium," explained the Minister of Railways and 
Canals in 1924, "radio telephony is unsurpassed and the 
administration believes that in the establishment of a radio 
department it has taken a unique and constructive step in railway 
operation."" 
CN radio had a two-fold significance. First, telephone lines, the 
vehicle for national broadcasting in the U.S., were not coordinated 
on a nation-wide basis in Canada until 1932, and CN's national 
network, developed by 1929, was thus the means by which 
advertisers such as Imperial Oil could reach a large market. Second, 
while CN built some of its own station facilities, it also leased other 
independent ones, thereby offering welcome assistance to 
increasingly hard-pressed local station owners. The financial 
limitations of network broadcasting were masked by CN's ability to 
employ its hotel orchestras, already on salary, and by its corporate 
structure. CN's expenditures on radio constitued a t  their height, only 
17.5 per cent of its entire outlay on advertising and publicity.32 The 
network ran aground, however, on political pressures to reduce the 
railway's overall expenditures, and the radio department was 
drastically cut back in 1931 and again in 1932. 
The legislative framework within which stations operated was a 
product of the pre-broadcasting radio era. Its basis lay in the Radio 
Telegraph Act of 1913, which, in contrast to contemporary 
American legislation, required that receiving sets as well as 
transmitters be licensed and gave to the responsible minister 
discretion ingranting licenses to applicant. Potentially restrictive, the 
act nevertheless liberally interpreted, in the hope that competition 
would stimulate improvement in the quality of transmission and 
programming.j3 As a result, while coverage in sparsely settled areas 
was poor, intermittent or non-existent, highly urbanized areas 
experienced the same problems of interference and overlapping 
which in all countries necessitated some form of government 
regulation. While the problems were in part soluble only by 
international agreement (eventually under the Havana Treaty of 
1941) they were one reason for the appointment, in 1928 of a Royal 
Commission headed by Sir John Aird, to investigate Canadian 
b r ~ a d c a s t i n g . ~ ~  
Government licensing policy aimed inpart to control the spread of 
direct adve r t i~ ing .~~  Its actual impact, however, is not at all clear. For 
one thing, it was only in the late twenties that advertisers really begun 
to use the sponsorship potentialities of radio programming. For 
another, station owners evaded government regulations by the use of 
"phantom" stations, a device whereby an advertiser would lease 
facilities and broadcast under his own call letters. The regulations 
themselves were open to changing interpretation, as the meaning of 
direct advertising narrowed over time. The director of the 
government's Radio Service told the House of Commons Radio 
Committee in 1932 that, "Direct advertising has finally come down 
to this after eight years, 'Thou shalt not mention prices or m~ney.""~ 
Critics of commercial radio decried the triumph of "advertising 
chatter" and the associated predominance of light entertainment 
programs. 
The public ownership debate of the early 1930's, then, followed 
upon a decade of uneven development. Radio programs were not 
only light; many of them were also American. Canadian listeners 
simply tuned in the signals of powerful American stations. Canadian 
broadcasters, moreover, picked up the popular sponsored and 
sustaining programs of the American networks at small cost: by 
pirating in some cases, by mutual agreement in others (including that 
of CN), or even by outright affiliation. Nationalist concerns 
therefore joined concerns for public service programming and 
demands for expanded station coverage at the forefront of the debate 
over broadcasting policy. They were placed there in large part by the 
efforts of the Canadian Radio League, an organization formed in 
October, 1930, to press for radio reform. 
The developing conflict was not one between diametrically 
opposed positions. Rather, the alternatives proposed occupied a 
fairly narrow middle ground, both ideologically and practically. For 
example, the Aird Royal Commission had recommended the 
establishment of a state-owned company which, supported by , 
license fees, subsidies and revenue from indirect advertising, would 
take over all broadcasting in Canada. The Radio League, around 
which the public ownership forces gathered, considerably modified 
this far-reaching proposal. It focused its major attention on network 
broadcasting, an area neglected in the Aird recommendations. The 
League argued that the government should establish a series of high 
power stations across the country which would bring national 
network programs to the bulk of the Canadian population. The 
network wirelines themselves were not to be publicly owned. Low 
power stations would remain at the local level, "be they operated 
commercially, by amateurs or by some civic authority."" For their 
part the station owners and their allies accepted the necessity of a 
government regulatory body to control licensing and oversee the 
quality of programs, including their advertising content. Moreover, 
they all argued that broadcasting required government assistance, 
although they were not united on the form such assistance might 
take. The government might construct and operate, at least for a 
time, stations in areas of small population. Or it might subsidize line 
costs for network transmission. Or it might establish its own network 
which would exist alongside a private one, to carry educational and 
"uplift" programs. The CPR proposed to set up a national 
broadcasting company to be supported by advertising andowned by 
the railways and the radio manufacturers, but even this would need a 
rebate of some portion of the license fees "until the company is on a 
self-sustaining basis."38 
Also, while the merits of radio advertising, both aesthetic and 
economic, were a subject of heated debate, it is important not to 
exaggerate the differences in the actual proposals which each side 
presented for dealing with advertising in Canadian broadcasting. 
The private interests defended the quality of programming in 
metropolitan areas and suggested that with government aid this 
could be extended across the country. One of the constant refrains of 
their campaign was Canadian manufacturers' need for access to 
radio advertising in order to compete with products from the U.S. 
Excesses could be prevented by regulation. In February, 1931, the 
Canadian Association of Broadcasters recommended to its menhers 
that they exclude advertising from Canadian programs broadcast on 
Sunday, and that during the week, after 7 p.m. advertising not exceed 
five per cent of program time. 
The League, on the other hand, did not reject radio advertising as 
such, though ideally some of its members would have preferred to do 
so. Rather it wished to impose controls on its nature and extent. The 
Aird Commission had recommended that direct advertising be 
eliminated, but added, in response to manufacturers' fears of 
American competition, that indirect advertising should be allowed to 
continue. That is, commercial sponsorship would be allowed but no 
direct sales appeal. The League retained the Aird proposal and 
suggested that advertising content be limited to five per cent of 
program time. 
Above all, the League's concept of public service radio derived its 
political strength more from the economic nerve it touched than 
from any widespread acceptance of its program implications. For if 
American history suggested that dependence on advertising 
threatened the public service potential of radio, it also suggested that 
radio advertising threatened the revenues of newpapers. In Canada, 
as in the U.S., newspapers had contributed greatly to the excitement 
surrounding the inception of radio broadcasting. They had followed 
closely the development of the new medium, a newsworthy subject in 
itself, and willingly had announced program schedules for their 
readers. Some had opened stations themselves as a means of indirect 
advertising, hoping to increase circulations. Also, they had 
responded to radio manufacturers as a source of advertising 
revenue.39 By 1931, however, Canadian newspapers were throughly 
apprehensive of radio competition, and the industry they confronted 
was by no means the giant which successfully fought off the press in 
the United States. 
In that year, at the annual meeting of the Canadian Daily 
Newspaper Association, members heard a report on the inroads 
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radio had made on the revenues of their American counterparts, and 
set up a joint committee with the Canadian Press to study the 
problem.40 The newspapers were caught in the proverbial cleft stick. 
They were reluctant to discontinue their program announcements, 
which by now often included the sponsor's name and even his 
product, for fear of losing readers; yet they were concerned about 
"the unprecedented amount of free publicity lavished upon this 
competing medi~m."~ '  Under the circumstances, the movement for 
nonicommercial broadcasting held enormous appeal and won their 
overwhelming support. Of twenty-seven papers in favour of a 
publicly-owned system in 1931, only four owned radio stations 
themselves. Of eight opposed to public ownership, five owned 
stations and two had close connections with local broadcasters. 42 At 
the 1931 meeting of the CDNA, a pamphlet by Graham Spry and 
Alan Plaunt, leaders of the Radio League, was distributed: "Radio 
Advertising - A Menace to the Newspaper and a Burden to  the 
Public." 
This is not to say that the press was hypocritical in its stress on the 
national need for public broadcasting, nor that Spry and Plaunt were 
cynical in their approach to the issue. Rather the newspapers' own 
financial interests coincided to a remarkable degree with the 
"national interest" as perceived by the public ownership movement, 
and Spry and Plaunt acted to  exploit it. After the creation of the 
CRBC in 1932 and to some extent after its replacement by the CBC in 
1936, newspapers pressured the public network to limitcommercial 
programming, but then, as radio became increasingly profitable, 
more publishers entered the business, and press attitudes toward 
private commercial broadcasting became correspondingly more 
f avo~rab le .~ '  The identity of interest between the vast 
majority of newspapers and the cause of public ownership was thus 
specific to the early thirties. It is difficult to overestimate their role in 
the success of the public ownership movement. 
It seems almost an assertion of faith to conclude that national 
feeling, because it was so widely expressed, was therefore the most 
important factor in determining the shape of the new system. 
Concern for national control of broadcasting communication was 
one factor, in Canada and elsewhere, which prompted government 
action of some kind in the radio field. The particular kind of action, 
however, which the Canadian government took, the political choice 
which it made, was a product of the financial pressures which 
impinged on Canadian radio at that time - the weakness of private 
broadcasting, the needs of advertisers, the almost unanimous 
demands of the press. 
A distinctive system did emerge, not from a unique Canadian 
mentality or ideology, but from particular Canadian conditions. The 
public ownership movement found significant support among 
Canadian businessmen, sufficient to ensure its partial success, 
because its concept of the national interest coincided with significant 
business needs. The state's active role in Canadian broadcasting, 
therefore, is not an  example of the way in which nationalism has 
produced a peculiar Canadian attitude to state economic activity. On 
the contrary, it is a case which suggests that businessmen in Canada 
have assessed, countenanced and encouraged state "intervention" 
according to  their economic requirements, an  approach strikingly 
similar to  that of their counterparts in other western capitalist 
societies. 
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